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Abstract. Ambient Assisted Living systems aim at providing automated support to
humans with special needs. Smart Homes equipped with Internet of Things infras-
tructure supporting the development of Ambient Intelligence which can look af-
ter humans is being widely investigated worldwide. As any IT based system, these
have strengths and also weaknesses. One dimension of these systems developers
want to strengthen is security, eliminating or at least reducing as much as possible
potential threats. The motivation is clear, as these systems gather sensitive infor-
mation about the health of an individual there is potential for harm if that informa-
tion is accessed and used by the wrong person. This chapter starts by providing an
analysis of stakeholders in this area. Then explains the IoT infrastructure used as a
testbed for the main security analysis methods and tools. Finally it explains a pro-
cess to assess the likelihood of certain vulnerabilities in the system. This process is
mainly focused on the design stage of a system. It can be iteratively combined with
development to inform a developing team which system architectures may be safer
and worth given development priority.
Keywords. Ambient Assisted Living, Attack Tree, IoT Model Checking
1. Introduction
Ambient Assisted Living systems [1] have been developed for several years already.
However being such a complex combination of technologies and having such a potential
impact in humans lives, require extra care in design and development. One important
advantage of such systems is that they provide an extra layer of care to people, especially
when for circumstantial reasons better care is not available. So for example, older people
prefer to live in their own independent space for as long as possible, however as they
age more special care and precautions are needed and may be there are no other humans
who can provide appropriate support at times. Systems which care raise alerts during
emergencies are then useful. Also other, subtler, assistance is equally important. For
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example, users starting to experience cognitive decline gradually start living out of synch
with healthy life rhythms and some phenomena such as day-night misalignments and sun
down syndrome can be observed in some cases [2,3].
Collecting fundamental life style patterns is useful to predict, advice, anticipate, and
in some cases being able to react to emergencies saving time and reducing the negative
effects of acute ill-health situations. Often the best person to assess the lifestyle infor-
mation is outside the place where the information is gathered. For example, a person
may be looked after by a smart home and those who need to have access to the system
diagnosis on whether a change on medication led to better quality of life may be placed
at a healthcare organization. Being able to securely transfer such sensitive information
is an important part of the system. Current systems include sophisticated mechanisms to
transport information securely from A to B, for example by using sophisticated security
protocols including complex encryption mechanisms. The weakest links at this point in
history are the participation of humans in the process (e.g., how do we know the person
reading the information at a hospital is the one the data is intended for) and also the weak
security mechanisms in various satellite technologies (e.g., Internet of Things gadgets).
This chapter explores the perception of users about the security of healthcare infor-
mation being collected in domestic environments and transported to another environment
for processing. First we show the results of questionnaires we run with various stakehold-
ers. Then we explain the infrastructure which has been used to test a system prototype to
aid the design of safer systems. Lastly a modelling system is illustrated showing how the
possibilities of vulnerabilities can be assessed in a given system, in this case illustrated
with the infrastructure previously described.
2. Stakeholders’ Perceptions
As part of our research project we have routinely gathered stakeholders’ perceptions,
focusing on three main groups of them: system developers (S), healthcare professionals
(H), and technology end users (U). We gathered opinions through an online questionnaire
at various events and stakeholders workshops totalling 48 respondents (S:14, H:14, U:18,
Others:2). Some questions were aimed at all respondents whilst other questions where
aimed at specific stakeholder categories. There was a mix of multiple choice and open
questions.
The following questions were addressed to end users only and from the 18 respon-
dents in this category they clustered themselves as follows for each of the questions
“How much do you know of the internal working of the security mechanisms ap-
plied to your data?”: 61% chose ‘not enough’, 17% chose ‘enough’ and 22% chose ‘a
considerable amount’.
“How much would you like to know of the internal working of the security mecha-
nisms applied to your data?”: 5% chose ‘not much or nothing’, 40% chose ‘just enough’
and 55% chose ‘a considerable amount’.
“How much are you prepared to let the system know about yourself if that translates
into greater security for your information?”: 64% chose ‘very little’, 36% chose ‘a lot’.
“What part of your private information would you be prepared to disclose if that
would guarantee a better monitoring for your specific condition?”: 33% chose ‘Personal
information: name, DOB, Phone number’, 0% chose ‘Current location and activity (use
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of electronic equipment, e.g. phone)’ and 47% chose ‘Anonymized medical data but
including age, weight, height, etc.’, and 20% chose ‘None of the above unless I can see
and understand how and where it is used’.
Amongst the questions aimed at all respondents we collected the following:
Question 12: “In a scale of 0-10 how high do you rate the security of the information
you transfer through the tools which are most important to your specific work?”
Question 13: “In a scale of 0-10 how high do you rate the level of security provided
by the tools which are most important to your specific work?”
Question 14: “In a scale of 0-10 how high do you rate the user-centred flexibility of
the security mechanisms that these tools offer which are most important to your specific
work?”
(a) Answers to Question 12. (b) Answers to Question 13. (c) Answers to Question 14.
Figure 1. Statistic extracted from the survey. The x-axis represents the percentage of participants who chose a
value of proposed scale from 1 to 10 (Y-axis).
Some take away messages of the results above indicate the reluctance of users to
share much personal information and the distrust on systems and tools handling their
personal data as well as the unfriendliness and lack of transparency of the tools they rely
on.
3. Pilot infrastructure
A pilot prototype was developed to create a real system wherein security concerns can be
tested by different tools. The pilot deployment was carried out within the Smart Spaces
lab at Middlesex University. Part of the Smart Spaces lab is set up as a smart room for
experiments within IoT and for use of the Research GrOup On Development of Intelli-
gent EnvironmentS. Figure 2 shows an accurate map of the lab with hardware elements
installed inside as server and sensors used, smart hub and processing unit.
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Figure 2. Lab map and hardware distribution.
3.1. System architecture
The approach to design the pilot architecture is based on create a smart home which
manages sensitive user’s information. This simulates a technological healthcare indoor
environment wherein the security concerns can be audited. The Pilot background is based
on indoor user’s activity recognition focus on dementia such as [4] shows. In addiction,
the user can provide personal health input through a mobile [5] such as blood rate using
a smart watch. Figure 3 shows the Pilot architecture and next sections describe each
element in more detail.
Figure 3. Initial Pilot 1 architecture
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1 - The house sensing environment:
A - Z-wave sensing network.
B - Vera Hub.
2 - Processing module
C - MReasoner tool
D - MReasoner’s database.
3 - Main Server
E - MySQL Database.
F - Web server and PHP API RESTful.
4 - Mobile Enviroment
G - Android mobile APP
3.1.1. Sensing environment
Sensing environment is the component which collects information from the house related
to user’s actions (e.g.: opening doors, switching on lights, etc.) or environment (e.g. tem-
perature in a room, humidity or quantity of light) by using sensor devices. This element
consists in a set of sensors distributed around the house and an smart hub which manages
them. The smart hub installed is a Vera Plus model which uses its own wireless Z-Wave
network to manage the sensors installed in the lab. The Z-Wave security implementation
features 128-bit encryption. Vera does not use a database but it stores devices configura-
tion and properties in JSON files and also writes in a non-persistent log the information
from sensors, e.g. the change of state of devices. JSON files and log can be queried by
external elements such as processor module (reasoner in figure 3) through 88 port by
using HTTP protocol. The installed devices range from motion sensors which can detect
movement in a place; switchers which informs about whether the light is on/off; energy
sensors which can give information about the appliance plugged; pressure sensors placed
on bed or chairs detect whether someone is sitting on it and reed sensors which are in-
stalled in doors, windows, cupboards, wardrobe and fridge door reporting if a door is
open or close. Figure 2 shows a precise picture of sensors’ location in the lab.
3.1.2. Processor module
The Processing Module (PM) requests the sensing information collected by Vera. PM
consists of temporal reasoning tool (MReasoner [6]) which infers sensors states and ex-
tracts logical conclusions about the user’s context. To illustrate what represents user’s
context an example used in this project is the Activity Daily Living (ADL) recognition.
These activities such are eating, sleeping, bathing, cooking or dressing are carrying out
in the house by the user. PM can determine the activity being performing with some de-
gree of verisimilitude. This activity recognition task is valuable in health environments
such as in houses of people with cognitive decline or dementia wherein the primary user,
the person living with dementia, is monitored. The gathered information about ADLs is
related to when the activities occur and how long the user spends doing them. This infor-
mation evidences behavioural patterns and deviations which can indicate an impairment
in user’s cognitive capacities. Beside professionals can use this information for user’s
evaluation, these systems provide efficient real-time monitoring which supports the care-
givers in their supervision tasks over patients [4] allowing them to take action in critical
situations such as user’s falls.
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3.1.3. Main server
The lab server (main server) plays the role of a normal server hosts in the cloud. It
is in charge to store the user’s health information to be accessible by doctors or other
persons involved, as well as by the own user, from any place and device. The basic server
configuration is similar to standard cloud servers. Thus, all connection with the server
from external devices are through HTTPS protocol hence those connection using other
protocols are refused. The web server manages a CRUD RESTful API developed in PHP.
It provides the layer to retrieve information from MySQL database. The API implements
register and login procedures using SHA1 password encryption, therefore, a user needs to
authenticate in the system to reach sensible data. The API also manage sessions, cookies
and other mechanisms related to security process such as blocking the user account, is
user exits, after three login attempts which avoids brute-force attacks.
3.1.4. APP mobile
This component represents a direct input from users. They can connect to the cloud
server sending and receiving data. The actions available are registration, log in, request
and send information. The mobile interface displays different Graphical Interfaces (GUI)
according to the user’s role varying the available actions. Figure shows the main menu
of both roles after the login process.
(a) Primary user main menu. (b) Secondary user main menu.
Figure 4. Mobile APP interface.
July 2019
4. A case study
A common processes in client-server applications are registration and log in. These
mechanisms play a crucial feature on security due to it grants access to users’ informa-
tion. The absence or deficiency of these procedures can report undesirable situations. In
this sort of environment an unauthorized person can access to user’s personal information
and misusing it without the owner approval and unknown aim. We think it is important
not just to analyse this process from the software point of view but also to show the users
the risk associated with their behaviours and personal actions in the system.
The current pilot provides a registration system in the server allowing users to cre-
ate an account based on their unique email and password chosen by them. A registered
user is associated with a role which can be a primary user (PU) or a secondary user(SU).
Depending on the assigned role a user will be able to access different information af-
ter log in. In this pilot the PU represents the person which is sending personal data to
the server, either using the mobile or through the house (sensing environment). Thus, a
logged PU can send data directly to the server and saved them but also can delete the
account, delete data and give or withdraw grants to SU for access PU data. A SU repre-
sents doctors, caregivers or relatives interested in accessing PU’s information. Initially,
SU does not have access to any data. Thus, the first action available for a logged SU is to
request authorization for access to PU’s information. Once the PU permits SU access, SU
can visualize user health information gathered whilst the PU does not revoke the access.
Next section describes the transformation process from a probabilistic Pilot IoT model
to SBIP system which evaluates the probability of an attack within the proposed context.
5. Modelling and evaluating a Pilot attack
Figure 5 is a graphical representation of the Pilot formal model described in the follow-
ing sections. From this model we develop the security analysis based on the framework
extensively described in [7].
5.1. Normal System, without an Attacker
The Primary User has two threads: a first one, called sensorData, sends signals to the
sensors in the house. The second thread, called giveAuth, is used when a secondary user

















Figure 5. The SmartHome model. The green lines represent normal communications, the blue ones commu-
nications with the Attacker and the red dotted lines are leaks occurring in the system.
A Secondary User has to first to get an authorization from the Primary User to access
its data. It can then access the data stored on the cloud. Note that the protocol used for
accessing the Primary User’s data requires an authorisation. Afterwards, either the user




















SecondaryUser = getAuthorisation.queryCloud (4)
The Equipment, consisting of the sensors in the house, are forwarding all data cap-
tured to the data storage unit.
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Equipment =Eq sensors←−−−− PU.Eq ssh−−→
data
DS.Equipment (5)
The Data Storage works as a server in the house. It receives and stores data, modeled
by the action receiveRawData, and does some analysis on them to compile behaviour
logs, which are then send on the cloud, using the action sendBehaviourLog.







The Cloud receives behaviour logs from the data storage, shown in receiveBL, and pro-












mobile-https←−−−−−− PU.queryAPI+ timeout.queryAPI) (8)
Cloud =receiveBL.Cloud+queryAPI (9)
5.2. System with an Attacker
The Attacker has several lines of attack, modeled by the thread AChoice and shown in






























collectPrimaryUser =A  PU.collectPrimaryUser
collectSecondaryUser =A  SU.collectSecondaryUser
collectCloud =A  Cloud.collectCloud
Attacker =AChoice |
collectPrimaryUser | collectSecondaryUser | collectCloud
The Primary User in Eq.2 has a new thread, leakAuth, where it gives its authorisation






The Secondary User in Eq.4 has two unsafe communications with the Attacker. It
can choose between giving his email address, in the thread leakEmail. And it also has
to choose between giving away his credentials or not, in the phishing attack modeled by
leakCredential. For simplicity, we do not model the normal behaviour of the Secondary
User when considering the attacks.
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SecondaryUser = leakEmail+ leakCredential
The Equipment in Eq.5 and Data Storage in Eq.6 have the same behaviours in the
system under attack.
The Cloud in Eq.9 has the same behaviour as before, except that it can also leak (or
not) the email of the Secondary User. Note that the thread queryAPIAttacker is similar to



















Monte Carlo Importance Splitting
Nb of Simulations Result (×10−4) Time (s) Result (×10−4) Time (s)
100 0 3,49 1,20 4,69
1000 0 5,12 1,43 8,17
10000 2,3 20,30 1,50 48,62
100000 1,2 399,82 out of memory
Figure 7. Experiments.
5.3. Experiments
Figure 7 shows the results from running statistical model checking to estimate the proba-
bility of a successful attack. In the model we use for the experiments, a leak is five times
less probable than an internal action.
From the figure we can infer the probability to be around 10−4. We can see that
Monte Carlo requires a larger number of simulations to estimate the probability of an at-
tack, whereas importance splitting can eastimate the probability using fewer simulations,
and in less time.
5.4. Other technical details
The protocols used are:
• mobile-https verifies users’ authorisation; used in communication with the Cloud.
• speaking assumes physical proximity.
• sensors assumes physical proximity.
• https verifies that the right url is used to access the Cloud.
• ssh verifies that the data storage knows the equipment it receives data from.
• mail verifies that the attacker knows the email address of the user it tries to attack.
6. Conclusions
This chapter presents a practical example of using a framework to model, understand and
analyse the security risks in a real IoT solution. Models aimed to real attacks analysis
are useful as an immediate tool for identifying the attacks to a system as part of its se-
curity audit. However, we also consider these models as a good way of making security
and privacy risks transparent to users, covering stakeholders concerns as expressed in the
survey. Attack trees provide a bigger and clearer picture of situations that can jeopardize
personal users information. This understandable information allows developing strate-
gies addressed to stakeholders concerns by improving their knowledge about a system
and security measures taken. Also, the final calculated probability of a successful attack
in a system section where the human component is included offers a quantitative measure
which is understandable by the general public (high risk/low risk). We are aware that the
proposed Pilot is not the most secure solution and it probably has many security breaches
to be improved. This is because its design has been constrained, just like in a real sce-
nario, by the available resources like limited funds, time, among others. Nevertheless,
using the proposed security analysis in early design stages can be beneficial to reach an
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effective solution such as the case of study explained here. Although the chapter covers
only one system attack scenario, the results show that there is a low attack probability
in the proposed process. Thus, designers and developers can focus on analysing other
procedures where risks could be higher. Hence, it can be said that this outcome allows
them to allocate resources in other system modules where sensitive information is more
exposed to potential harms. Thereby, the methods proposed in this chapter provide an un-
derstandable representation of the system risks that is useful for users and a quantitative
analysis that is valuable for the developers.
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